TOWARDS A RELIGIOUSLY HYBRID IDENTITY? The Changing Face of Javanese Islam by Hilmy, Masdar
  
The Changing Face of Javanese Islam 
45 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 12, Number 01, June 2018 
TOWARDS A RELIGIOUSLY HYBRID IDENTITY?  
The Changing Face of Javanese Islam 
Masdar Hilmy 
UIN Sunan Ampel, Surabaya – Indonesia | masdar.hilmy@gmail.com 
Abstract: This article seeks to revisit the discussion of 
Javanese Islam from an alternative point of view. It argues 
that the presentation of Javanese Islam in the previous 
studies is no longer adequate to accommodate the most 
current transformation of Javanese Islam. The identity of 
Javanese Islam can neither be seen from syncretic point of 
view nor normative perspective per se, since the identity of 
Javanese Islam has transformed itself into something 
different from the past. Becoming an abangan or santri in 
the post-Geertz era, represents the making of a religiously 
hybrid identity. In the context of Geertz, to become an 
abangan means he/she cannot become a santri at once. At 
that time, a pure and puritan abangan, was hardly a 
practicing Muslim, but nominal Muslim. Becoming a santri, 
on the other hand, had to be done by disentangling any 
type of identity in kejawen sense. Javanese Islam has to do 
with whatever-you-like mentality that forms a hybrid 
identity among the Javanese Muslims. 
Keywords: Javanese Islam, kejawen/abangan, santri, hybrid 
identity. 
 
Introduction 
Javanese Islam has long been the subject of academic debate 
among scholars and social scientists. One of the most frequently 
debated issues in this context is, inter alia, who and what constitutes 
Javanese Islam. To this question, suffice it to say that there are two 
opposing poles of thought. On the one hand, there is the so-called 
Geertzian pole arguing that Javanese Islam is a version of religion 
different from its counterpart in Arabian Peninsula.1 According to this 
                                                                
1 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (New York: Glencoe Press, 1960). 
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pole, Javanese Islam is a distorted version of religion due to its 
contamination with local Javanese culture. Geertz presented the profile 
of Javanese Islam in a syncretic sense comprising three major elements 
as follows: abangan (nominal Muslims), santri (devout Muslims), and 
priyayi (Javanese aristocrats). 
There is an opposite view to that of Geertz, written several years 
later and not representing the same breadth or depth of analytical force 
as did Geertz’s work. This is the idea that Javanese Islam is the same 
religion as its counterpart elsewhere due to the fact that Javanese Islam 
is derived from the same normative root. Woodward represents this 
rather simplistic interpretation.2 In his opinion, the Javanese Islam can 
be seen as the juncture where normative piety as sanctioned in its 
sacred texts, i.e. the Qur’an and Hadith, meet with local values and 
rituals mainly preoccupied by Sufi mystical interpretation. The slametan, 
labeled by Geertz as the prototype of a syncretic Javanese ritual, is 
taken by Woodward as an example of how the Javanese Muslims 
interpret the standard Islamic piety into the code of conduct of 
Javanese tradition. 
Leaving aside the two competing standpoints above, this article 
tries to seek the third alternative by arguing that the concept of 
Javanese Islam has transformed into a hybrid identity different from 
each of those opinions above due to Islamization and acculturation 
process at once. This argument leads to the assumption that neither of 
the two represents the most authentic self of the Javanese Islam today. 
Whereas Geertz’s notion of Javanese Islam is colored by his 
subjectivity about being an authentic Islam vis-à-vis syncretic and 
nominal Islam, Woodward’s standpoint equaling the Javanese Islam to 
normative Islam tends to undermine the reality of acculturation 
process among the Javanese Muslims.  
 
Paradigmatic Loophole 
It must be acknowledged from the outset that both the proponents 
of syncretic and normative standpoints of Javanese Islam fall under 
one same theoretical approach: that of Weberian.3 This means that 
                                                                
2 Mark R. Woodward, Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of 
Yogyakarta (Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1989). 
3 For further accounts on Weberian approach, see, among others, Randall Collins, 
Weberian Sociological Theory (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 
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regardless of the diametrical difference in argument, both Geertz and 
Woodward use Weberian approach that places the analysis of religion 
on cultural basis. Under this approach, Islam is viewed as a closed 
entity immune to change. Due to this reason, the entity of Javanese 
Islam is assumed to hold values and norms that are specific and unique 
different to one another. As a result, the narrative of the Javanese 
Islam tends to be value-heavy, apart from the analysis of geographical 
determinism that is also crucial in the making of Javanese Islam.4 This 
is so due to the fact that Weberian analysis weighs more on intrinsic 
aspects of religion rather than extrinsic ones such as the structural 
analysis of political economy of religion.  
As far as the study of Javanese Islam is concerned, the theoretical 
approach outside Weberian approach such as Marxian or neo-Marxian 
approach is hardly employed.5 Scholars of the studies of Java and 
Islam after Geertz—such as Andrew Beatty,6 Woodward, Robert 
Hefner—seem unable to avoid the use of this approach. As a result, 
the analysis of those scholars falls into the superiority of cultural value-
based analysis over sociological power-relation. Among those scholars, 
it is perhaps only Hefner who attempted to cope with the hegemony 
of Weberian approach into Islam, even though he in the end cannot 
avoid the use of this approach.7 In his analysis, Hefner touches upon 
how the mechanism of political economy plays its role in the massive 
conversion among the Javanese people from Hindu-Buddhism into 
Islam, a phenomenon that he sees only happens in the agrarian society 
like the people of Java.  
                                                                                                                                      
1986); see also, Sam Whimster, Understanding Weber (London & New York: Routledge, 
2007). 
4 For further account on geographical determinism, see, among others, Werner Stark, 
Sociology of Knowledge: Towards a Deeper Understanding of the History of Ideas (New Brunswick 
& London: Transaction Publishers, 1991), especially pp. 213-244. 
5 For more detailed description on Marxian approach, see, for instance, John F. Sitton, 
Recent Marxian Theory: Class Formation and Social Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). 
6 Andrew Beatty, “Adam and Eve and Vishnu: Syncretism in the Javanese Slametan”, 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 2/No. 2 (1996): 271-288; See, also, 
Andrew Beatty, Varieties of Javanese Religion: An Anthropological Account (Cambridge & 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
7 Robert W. Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1990). 
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Unlike the Weberian analysis that puts its heavy emphasis on the 
importance of culture,8 the Marxian or neo-Marxian analysis works on 
the major assumption that structure does matter.9 In the context of 
Javanese Islam, the Marxian or neo-Marxian analysis will take non-
cultural aspects such as politics, economy and institutions into serious 
account. Such an analysis would go beyond the importance of culture 
as an autonomous aspect in the making of Javanese Islam. Rather, it is 
structures that forge all culture-related aspects such as norms and 
values. What is meant by structure in this context is all aspects outside 
of religion such as opportunity structure, political economy structure, 
institutional structure as well as authoritative structure. It is 
unfortunate that most of the scholars of Javanese Islam in the era of 
Geertz and after exploited the Weberian approach more instead of 
Marxian or neo-Marxian counterpart so that the result of their analysis 
puts cultural values above all structural aspects of Javanese Islam. 
The unbalanced analysis on Javanese Islam results in the unfair and 
misrepresented narratives of this matter. Javanese Islam tends to be 
perceived as unimportant and peripheral in the configuration of Islam 
as a whole. Such a misconception creates further multiplier effect that 
the Javanese Islam can be regarded an inauthentic distorted and 
downgraded variant of religion. In contrast, Islam in the place of its 
origin, Arabian Peninsula, tends to be regarded as authentic and pure 
religion. Such a viewpoint did not take geographical determination into 
serious account when explaining Javanese Islam, something that 
determines the subtle and continuous metamorphosis Islam has been 
undergoing in the far-away land from its place of origin. It is likely that 
such a perception was taken from the one-sided sources of 
information during the time Geertz undertook his field research. This 
misperception, however, leads to an essentialist judgment that 
undermines the objective reality of Javanese Islam at work.  
At the other extreme of the pole, there are scholars who defend 
the degree of “Islamicity” of the Javanese Islam. Mark R Woodward is 
a case in point of the proponent of this pole. He argues that the 
Javanese Islam is not a distorted or downgraded version of authentic 
                                                                
8 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 
9 James Duncan and David Ley, “Structural Marxism and Human Geography: A 
Critical Assessment”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 72, No. 1 
(March 1982): pp. 30-59. 
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Islam just because this religion is accompanied by local elements such 
as slametan rituals.10 He seems to stand in firm opposition to Geertz. As 
in any other part of the Muslim world, he argues, Islam faces the 
complexity of translating its message into the local way of life. In this 
context, the slametan ritual—to which Geertz attributes as a typically 
syncretistic ritual—is a manifestation of normative piety as sanctioned 
in its textual sources such as the Qur’an and the Prophetic sayings 
(Hadith). The way Woodward builds his argument, nevertheless, is 
poorly founded due to the fact that acculturation is at work when one 
explains the reality of Javanese Islam. It is clear from his antithetical 
position to Geertz that Woodward undermines the long term process 
of acculturation of Islam into the web of Javanese culture that makes 
this religion unique to its counterparts in any other parts of the world.  
Outside of the two poles above, there can be found scholars who 
try to stand in a fair and neutral position. One of them is Marshall G.S. 
Hodgson, a historian from the University of Chicago. In his book, The 
Venture of Islam (1974), he severely criticizes Geertz’s conception of 
Javanese Islam as partially influenced by modernist vision of Islam. 
Hodgson further argues that: 
“Unfortunately, its general high excellence is marred by a major 
systematic error: influenced by the polemics of a certain school of 
modern Shari’ah-minded Muslims, Geertz identifies ‘Islam’ only 
with what that school of modernists happens to approve, and 
ascribes everything else to an aboriginal or a Hindu-Buddhist 
background, gratuitously labelling much of the Muslim religious 
life in Java ‘Hindu’. He identifies a long series of phenomena, 
virtually universal to Islam and sometimes found even in the 
Qur’an itself, as un-Islamic; and hence his interpretation of the 
Islamic past as well as of some recent anti-Islamic reactions is 
highly misleading”.11    
The quotation above presents Geertz’s glaring carelessness in 
seeing the reality of Javanese Islam. This means that Geertz, as a 
scholar and anthropologist, had been unable to cope with problems of 
distancing himself epistemologically from the object of his study: 
Javanese Islam. Quoting his analysis on the Javanese Islam, Hodgson 
                                                                
10 Mark R. Woodward, “The Slametan”: Textual Knowledge and Ritual Performance 
in Central Javanese Islam”, History of Religions, Vol. 28/No. 1 (Aug 1988): pp. 54-89. 
11 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World 
Civilization, vol. 2 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974), p. 551, footnote # 1. 
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argues that “When the gentry adopted Islam, these traditions were 
woven into Sufism, which they enriched and endowed with a 
distinctively Javanese beauty”.12 
Apart from scientific approach he employs, Geertz is also mistaken 
in making the trilogy of Javanese religion: santri, abangan and priyayi. As 
much has been written on this, the mistake lies at his consistency in 
making his argument on the basis of social category, not religious one. 
From the three categories of Javanese religion, it is only santri and 
abangan that are classified on the basis of religious category, while 
priyayi is made based on social class category.13  
It is quite surprising to see the fact that regardless of weaknesses in 
Geertz’s analysis, his influence over the later generations of scholars 
who studied Javanese Islam continues. Geertz seems to have 
established himself as the leading authoritative source in the studies of 
Javanese Islam in the 1960s and long after. In the studies of Islam and 
Java, his influence has been so tremendous that no one can avoid his 
name when studied this subject. His name cannot only be found in 
anthropological studies on Islam and Java from which his academic 
reputation starts to boost, but also in other studies such as Islamic 
studies, politics, sociology as well as other interdisciplinary studies. In 
other words, the studies of Javanese Islam seem incomplete without 
referring to his name as well as his scholarly works.  
  
The Transformation of Javanese Islam 
As an academic subject, Javanese Islam is not a closed entity and 
immune to change. Along the course of time, Javanese Islam has 
undergone a process of evolution and transformation into something 
different from the past, either at the surface level or its core essence. 
Referring to the Javanese Islam as identical with what Geertz has 
                                                                
12 Ibid., p. 551. 
13 For further details on this, see Harsja W. Bachtiar, “The Religion of Java: Sebuah 
Komentar”, in Clifford Geertz, Abangan, Santri, Priyayi dalam Masyarakat Jawa, 
translated by Aswab Mahasin (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1989). 
13 The fact that the Javanese Muslims cannot be characterized by a discrete identity 
seems to have confirmed what Erich Kolig’s theoretical assumtion. In his opinion, 
Muslims especially in Central Java cannot be demarcated according to black-and-white 
fault line—especially among the moderate and radical ones—is because the religious 
identity among them is so fluid and unstable. For further description on this, see, 
Erich Kolig, “Radical Islam, Islamic Fervour, and Political Sentiments in Central Java, 
Indonesia”, European Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 4/No. 1 (2005): pp. 55-86. 
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defined in the 1960s is undoubtedly irrelevant to this time. This 
underlines the fact that Weberian approach that treats Javanese Islam 
as a closed entity untouched by change is theoretically unacceptable. 
It seems that what is meant by Geertz as Javanese Islam covers 
only abangan variant, not santri. Geertz uses the label agama Jawi (the 
religion of Java) for abangan or kejawen group, while he uses the term 
agami santri for the practicing or devout Muslims. For santri, the label 
Javanese Islam might exempt themselves from this group because they 
apply different system of rituals. Ricklefs uses the term kaum putihan 
(white community) for santri. In his opinion, it is the devout Javanese 
Muslims who labelled themselves to be golongan putihan (the whites).14 
This group was in general characterized by better social and economic 
status than the abangan counterparts; usually they are more wealthy, 
wear better clothes, have bigger houses, live more orderly life, avoid 
opium, the provision of better and higher education for their kids, and 
more disciplined. 
Geertz’s depiction of Javanese Islam above, nevertheless, raises a 
further critical evaluation: is it the case for today’s context? Is Geertz’s 
depiction still relevant? Perhaps this is one of the most critical 
loopholes in Geertz’s analysis of the Javanese Islam. The denotative 
meaning as contained in the term “Javanese Islam” as the kejawen or 
abangan variant needs further evaluation for today’s context, due in part 
to the fact that the landscape of Javanese Islam has undergone a 
significant transformation which is far different from its description of 
the past. First of all, the identity of kejawen or abangan is not a closed 
and discrete entity which demarcates from other variants, especially the 
santri community.15 These two groups are to a large extent not 
demarcated by a black-white and firm fault lines. The time-span of 
more five decades since Geertz and his colleagues undertook their 
research projects in “Modjokuto” (Pare, near Kediri in East Java) has 
seen significant changes in identity configuration among Javanese 
                                                                
14 MC. Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social and Religious 
History, c. 1930 to Present (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), pp. 49-51. 
15 The fact that the Javanese Muslims cannot be characterized by a discrete identity 
seems to have confirmed what Erich Kolig’s theoretical assumtion. In his opinion, 
Muslims especially in Central Java cannot be demarcated according to black-and-white 
fault line—especially among the moderate and radical ones—is because the religious 
identity among them is so fluid and unstable. For further description on this, see, 
Erich Kolig, “Radical Islam, Islamic Fervour, and Political Sentiments in Central Java, 
Indonesia”, European Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 4/No. 1 (2005): pp. 55-86. 
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Muslims in which the process of identity exchanges between the two 
has occurred. This leads to the making of an in-between Muslim 
identity, analytically blurred, signifying that there is no one-fits-all 
religious identity in among the Javanese Muslims.  
Second, the dichotomy of abangan-santri has often been adopted to 
explain how stream politics (politik aliran) works in the context of 
Indonesia’s early politics after independence (Carnegie, 2010). During 
the consecutive three decades—the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s—the 
explanation of politik aliran might be applicable in analyzing the 
ideological and political contest between the two groups. In reality, the 
explanation of politik aliran (in the sense of political contest between 
the two) is no longer relevant in so far as democracy has been applied 
in this country that enables all elements of society take part in an open 
electoral competition that reaches the grass-roots. Furthermore, the 
santri community—both the modernists and traditionalists—has 
transformed ideologically in such a way that their political platform is 
no longer different from that of the abangan community: both have 
arrived at the same agreement to uphold Negara Kesatuan Republik 
Indonesia (NKRI, Unitary Form of the Republic of Indonesia), 
Pancasila, UUD 1945 and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. 
Third, the deepening proses of Islamization in Java has eroded the 
existence of kejawen community on the one hand and boosted 
quantitatively the existence of the santri at its highest profile on the 
other. This is perfectly in line with what MC Ricklefs and Hefner 
conclude in their works respectively, that the deepening process of 
Islamization has been intensified particularly during the second half of 
the New Order regime and its aftermath up until more recently.16 Due 
to this reason, it is hardly found an ideological contest between the 
abangan and santri in the public realm as it was in the past as a result of 
closer ideological views between the two.  
The reality of decrease of kejawen community has been confirmed 
by several survey indicating the increase of normative observance and 
obedience among Indonesian Muslims. A survey undertaken by Riaz 
Hassan, for instance, indicates clearly how nominal Muslims in 
                                                                
16 Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java, pp. 274-317. See, also, Robert W. 
Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), p. 84. 
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Indonesia have been replaced by the practicing Muslims.17 According 
to this research, significant number of Indonesian Muslims (96%) 
claim that they performed five daily prayers, fasting during Ramadhan 
month (99%), paying alms giving, and other normative observance.18 
The observance of Indonesian Muslims is above any other Muslim 
countries in the world, such as Malaysia, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and even 
Saudi Arabia itself. This survey, thus, indicates the thesis of deepening 
process of Islamization among Indonesian Muslims which implies the 
increase of devout Muslims on the one hand, and the decrease of 
kejawen Muslims, on the other.  
Another survey was carried out by PPIM UIN Jakarta in 2006 and 
2010, as cited by Ricklefs, which shows that there was a significant 
bulk of Javanese Muslims in Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java, 
who observed five daily prayers and alms giving. In 2006, there was 
90% of Muslims in Java that claimed to observe five daily prayers 
routinely, while it decreased a little bit in 2010 to 89 %. While 93% of 
Muslims in Java claimed that they paid alms in 2006, the number 
increased a bit in 2010 to 94%.19 Furthermore, another local survey 
undertaken in a sub-district Jekulo, Kudus, Central Java, in 2007 
reveals that 81% of Muslims said that they carried out the five daily 
prayers and alms-giving. Lastly, in Kediri, the number of Muslims who 
observe rituals based on a survey in the same year indicates that the 
number of Muslims who did five daily prayers reaches 92%, while 
those who paid alms-giving was 95%.20   
The Islamization process among the Javanese Muslims—both 
quantitatively and qualitatively speaking—indicates the successful 
penetration of this religion into the heart of socio-cultural life of Java. 
The 5 century time-span of Islamization since this religion was 
introduced to Java has created internal dynamics and tension among 
the Javanese. The relative success is partly attributed to the 
acculturation machine that works at the socio-political and cultural 
level. Unlike Islamization in other parts of the world where the 
encounter of two cultural elements is colored by military conquest, the 
                                                                
17 Riaz Hassan, “On Being Religious: Patterns of Religious Commitment in Muslim 
Societies”, The Muslim World, Vol. 97 (July 2007): pp. 437-478. 
18 Ibid., p. 452. 
19 Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java, p. 448. 
20 Ibid., p. 449. 
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conquest of Java is accompanied by cultural dialogue and acculturation 
that paves the way for Islam to be accepted more widely by the 
Javanese community as a major religion of this island. 
Another side of the Islamic conquest of Java confirms the working 
of Sufi tradition that becomes the catalyst for local spirituality. The 
majority of Javanese seems to be more esoteric while avoiding exoteric 
dimension with black-and-white and legalistic vision of religion. Such a 
characteristic finds its relevance in Sufism in Islamic tradition with the 
emphasis on inner-dimension of human life. In this context, Ricklefs 
maintains that 
“It is important to note that such evidence as we have from the 
early centuries of Islam in Java supports the view that mysticism –
Sufism—was the dominant style of Islam there. The two sixteenth 
century manuscripts that survive are both mystical. Later Javanese 
legends about Islamization tell of people with mystical insights 
and magical powers. The transition from mystical Hindu-
Buddhism to mystical Islam was thus presumably eased by 
conceptual continuities”.21 
The Sufi tradition of Javanese Islam, to which Ricklefs refers as the 
mystic synthesis, is characterized by three prominent features as 
follows.22 The first feature is the sense of Islamic identity due to the 
fact that this religion is the most conceivable religious identity. In this 
context, it is said that most of the Javanese aristocrats such as Sultan 
Mangkubumi (Hamengkubuwono I, 1749-92), the first Sultan of 
Yogyakarta, take Islamic mysticism and piety into serious consideration 
as his religious identity. The second feature is the fulfilment of five 
pillars of Islamic ritualistic observance—the confession of the faith, 
five daily prayers, alms giving, Ramadhan fasting and pilgrimage to 
Mecca for those who are able to do so. The third feature is the 
acceptance of local spiritual forces such as the queen of the Southern 
Ocean (Ratu Kidul).23     
Islamization among the Javanese has implicitly threatened the 
extinction of all related aspects of abangan or kejawen. As widely known, 
kejawen or abangan comprises non-practicing Muslims. Even though 
                                                                
21 MC Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions (c. 1830-1930) 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), p. 3. 
22 Ibid., p. 5. 
23 Ibid., p. 7. 
  
The Changing Face of Javanese Islam 
55 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 12, Number 01, June 2018 
they proclaim as Muslims, they want to detach from the identity of the 
putihans or santris. This extinction can lead to the loss of abangans’ 
narratives of belief system and rituals from the grand narrative of 
Javanese Islam. This reality has demonstrated the weak self-defence 
mechanism of the kejawens in facing the intense invasion of the santri’s 
worldview. What happens at the grassroots, nonetheless, the 
Islamization has been achieved in tandem with acculturation as 
represented in the slametan rituals which is cyclically done through steps 
of life.24  
In the spectrum of Javanese Islam, the slametan rituals undoubtedly 
represent a creative novelty invented by elder generation of Muslim 
propagators in order to attach Islam into the structure of Javanese 
religious life. As an invented practice, the slametan does not take roots 
explicitly from its sacred texts, the Qur’an and Hadith. Prior to being 
fully accepted and practiced by Javanese Muslims, the major bulk of 
slametan elements were occupied by the non-Islamic symbols such as 
offerings and sayings or prayers spelled out in old Javanese language. 
In addition, the rituals were led by a local Javanese dukun (most 
respected figures in the hierarchy of society due to their mastery in old 
Javanese wisdom). It is not until lately that the slametan have commonly 
been led by kiai (Muslim preachers or clerics) who are well versed in 
Islamic knowledge and are usually pesantren (Islamic boarding school) 
graduates. It is they who have replaced all Hindu-Buddhist derived 
elements with Islamic ones taken from sayings and prayers of the 
Qur’an and Hadith.  
Santris themselves have responded to this acculturation process in 
various ways. For the traditional santris, the acculturation has been 
regarded as intercultural marriage between the two: normative Islam 
and local culture which can form an accepted hybridity of Javanese 
Islam. Since the outset, the traditionalists do not see such an 
acculturation as contradictory to the orthodoxy of normative Islam. 
They even utilize the cyclical events of human life as a part of 
Islamization projects by replacing the major parts of the slametan with 
Islamic elements such as the replacement of Javanese prayers with 
Arabic ones. They also remove the sacred meaning of sesajen (offerings) 
into something artificial.  
                                                                
24 Masdar Hilmy, “Islam and Javanese Acculturation: Textual and Contextual Analysis 
of the Slametan Ritual” (Unpublished MA Thesis, Montreal: McGill University, 1999). 
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For the Muslim modernists, however, the acculturation of Islam 
into Javanese culture is regarded as an unfinished business in terms of 
Islamization process. For them, the tradition of slametan ritual 
represents the mixture of kejawen elements with those of Islam, 
something anthropologically impossible to mix in their mind due to 
contradictory nature within them. To the majority of Muslim 
modernists, the slametan tradition does not represent an Islamic way of 
life because it is already contaminated with non-Islamic or local 
elements. In their opinion, the slametan rituals do not have strong and 
sound justification from the Islamic texts such as the Qur’an and 
Hadith. Due to this reason, the majority of Muslim modernists would 
classify the slametan rituals as innovation (bid’ah) which is considered 
theologically illegal in Islam.    
Among the abangans, such rituals as slametan represents the core 
tradition initiated fully in Javanese ways and worldview, part of which 
is Javanese offerings and utterances which are believed to have 
spiritual power.25 With the passage of time, village kiais—the most of 
whom are the graduates of pesantren—have Islamized gradually the 
major parts of the slametan by replacing the Javanese elements with 
those of Arabic origins. As a consequence, the content and form of 
those rituals become gradually more Arabicized (or Islamicized) thanks 
to the creative hands of those kiais. In this context, it is hardly found in 
today’s context any slametan ritual performed in pure kejawen ways, 
thereby kejawen tradition has been transformed and, as a result, 
marginalized in such a way that it is in jeopardy.  
 
The Reconstruction of Javanese Islam 
On the basis of the explanation above, the definition of what 
constitutes Javanese Islam cannot avoid noting the transformation 
which this variant of religion has undergone so far. To defend the two 
spectrums above—those who simplify Javanese Islam as an abangan or 
kejawen religious entity and the proponents of normative Islam—is no 
longer realistic, due to the change of religious configuration that has 
changed the empirical reality of Javanese Islam. The entity of Javanese 
Islam, therefore, is no longer identical with the same entity in the 
1960’s or 1980’s. To reduce the Javanese Islam into a mere kejawen or 
abangan variant of religion, therefore, is no longer valid because there 
                                                                
25 Ibid. 
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are a lot of younger generation of abangan who have been more deeply 
Islamicized (becoming practicing Muslims). The kejawen religious 
system does not have a strong self-defense mechanism in facing the 
waves of Islamization process. As a consequence, their belief system is 
under serious threat and this can lead to the replacement of their ritual 
system with santri rituals such as five daily prayers, fasting during 
Ramadhan, paying alms giving, and pilgrimage to Mecca.  
Even though the process of Islamization has been achieved at the 
most intensive level than before, it does not mean that there is no 
cultural resistance at all among the grass roots. As written by Ricklefs, 
the influence of Keraton (Mataram) tradition has been the main 
obstacle to the Islamic movement’s influence at deeper levels of the 
society.26 A report was made that the ideas of black magic supported 
by the Keraton tradition has served as the barrier of Islamic 
penetration that leads to associationism (shirk) among the Muslims. 
Javanese kings are believed to have an intimate relationship with spirits 
such as Ratu Laut Kidul and spirits of Merapi mountain and Lawu 
mountain. A series of typically kejawen festivals are still being held until 
today such as washing all sacred regalia of the kingdom (pusaka) during 
the first month of the Javanese calendar, a tradition that is not found 
in any Islamic tradition elsewhere in the world.27 
Despite the fact that the Islamization process has been carried out 
at the most intensive level, a series of small group of abangan choose to 
defend. In some cities, such as Jombang, Kediri, Nganjuk, 
Tulungagung, Trenggalek and other cities in East Java there still can be 
found some kejawen groups such as Sumarah, Sapto Dharmo, Jawa Dipa, 
and many others.28 This means that the Islamization process cannot 
convert a small number of abangan and they choose to stay with their 
old tradition of kejawen. This small group of abangan, nevertheless, is 
unable to offer the contending vision of the santris in terms of rituals 
and belief system. It is understandable that the abangan does not show 
much development; rather, their practices have been dying among the 
majority of practicing Muslims. This condition is totally different from 
the condition of the 1950’s and the 1960’s where the spiritual and 
religious realm was dominated by kejawen belief. The younger 
                                                                
26 Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java, p. 594. 
27 Ibid., p. 560. 
28 Niels Mulder, Mysticism in Java: Ideology in Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2005), pp. 
75-81. 
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generation of kejawen community who turned to be santris 
acknowledges that there is no regret in regards to their internal 
conversion and they are even proud of their parents who also 
converted prior to their death. 
On the contrary, considering Javanese Islam as an identical version 
of normative Islam or Islamic orthodoxy undoubtedly ignores the 
acculturation that makes Javanese Islam a unique and distinctive 
version of religion. To hold the view that the slametan tradition 
represents the normative or pure version of Islam denies the existence 
of Muslim modernists who reject it, or a contradiction to the empirical 
existence of Islam outside of Java and in the rest of the world. It is a 
matter of fact that Javanese Islam is made of culturally blended 
elements that makes it “exotic” and distinctive. Due to this reason, 
various types of acculturation and chemistry between Islam and local 
tradition as manifested in the slametan rituals represents the reality on 
the ground.  
Referring to Javanese Islam, therefore, cannot be done in terms of 
practicing or non-practicing Muslims. Javanese Islam is a variant of 
Islam in its totality, whose cultural manifestation and features are 
distinctively different from what Geertz and Woodward have 
constructed before. Javanese Islam, to a larger extent, is shared by both 
santris and abangans in its cultural identity or ritual practices. 
Dichotomizing the abangans from the santris, thus, is no longer relevant 
for today’s context. This is so not only because there is a great deal of 
“santrinized” abangans, but also because the majority of (traditionalist) 
santris have shared rituals and festivals owned only by the abangans in 
earlier times.  
The same assumption may also apply to the Muslim modernists. 
Their interaction with the traditionalists as well as the abangans may 
have led to the reconsideration of their cultural strategy in approaching 
the Javanese society in general. The adoption of a cultural strategy in 
doing propagation (dakwah), for instance, has helped in moderating 
their unbending theological standpoints on various types of Javanese 
Muslim rituals (PP Muhammadiyah, 2004).29 Some of them have even 
                                                                
29 The issue of culture received its prominence among Muhammadiyah members 
particularly after the 43rd Muktamar in Aceh in 1995. This is because this organization 
was criticized by its members such as Kuntowijoyo as being too rigid and dry culturally 
as a result of purificationist nature contained in its mission. It is within its 2005 
congress in Malang. 
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wedded some dimension of Javanese culture into their religious 
practices by desacralizing the Javanese types of rituals as a merely 
cultural. This means that they incorporate some popular Javanese 
festivals such jaranan or reog performance by disentangling the sacred 
symbolic meanings from their performance.30  
It must also be acknowledged the Islamic acculturation into 
Javanese culture contributes to the waning of kejawens on the one hand, 
and Islamic identity of santris on the other hand. Javanese Islam is thus 
an eclectic identity comprising the relative mixture of normative Islam 
and local Javanese elements at once which is never monolithic and 
black-and-white. Within the acculturation process there is a never-
ending process of cultural negotiation between the two, colored by an 
overlapping consensus; the santris borrow the religious identity of the 
abangans and vise-versa, the abangans incorporate into the identity of the 
santris. What is meant by religious identity in this context is cultural and 
theological features ranging from physical appearance, cultural 
attributes to religious rituals. It is due to this reality that sorting the 
abangans and the santris is almost impossible. 
On the socio-political level, this mode of acculturation also 
contributes to the melting dichotomy of secular-nationalist and 
religious-santris in terms of stream politics (politik aliran). To use the 
perspective of stream politics to explain the present-day political 
context is hardly relevant, even though there are few politicians who 
keep employing the argument of stream politics to attract the minority 
of abangans in a limited direct local election (Pilkada) by remaking the 
identity politics. The use of stream politics, nevertheless, receives its 
serious contender among the society by the existence of rational choice 
tendency. The melting of stream politics can be seen, among others, in 
the establishment of religious units under abangan-based political party 
such as Megawati’s Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) and the 
involvement of young santri background politicians in non-santri based 
political parties.31 In short, there is no longer ideological demarcation 
                                                                
30 For further information on Reog performance, see, for instance, Margaret J. Kartomi, 
“Performance, Music, and Meaning of Reyog Ponorogo”, Indonesia, 22 (October 1976): 
pp. 84-130.  
31 Megawati’s PDI Perjuangan established a Muslim unit called Baitul Muslimin 
Indonesia. Its organizational structure is taken from mainstream religious 
organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Each Chairman 
respectively, Said Aqiel Sirodj and Din Syamsuddin, serve as its advisors, in addition to 
Megawati herself.  
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separating the abangans from the santris as the acculturation (or 
Islamization) has more intensively been taking place at all levels in the 
society.  
 
Towards A Hybrid Identity 
Becoming an abangan or santri in the post-Geertz era represents the 
making of a religiously hybrid identity. In the context of Geertz, to 
become an abangan means he/she cannot become a santri at the same 
time. At that time, a pure and puritan abangan, was hardly a practicing 
Muslim, but rather only a nominal Muslim. A Javanese with such an 
identity did not have any option except putting on his/her Javanese 
attributes in abangan sense with all integrity, starting from such trivial 
things as dress-code, cultural hobbies such as bird keeping and 
traditional Javanese music (klenengan),32 to the most fundamental 
aspects of Javanese identity such as rituals which were not shared with 
the santris, especially the modernist Muslims.  
Likewise becoming a santri, one had to distance oneself from any 
type of identity in kejawen sense, from trivial things to the most 
substantive ones. He/she had to enter into the realm of santri identity 
in its totality as a practicing Muslim. Anyone associated with santri 
identity was required to observe mandatory rituals as contained in the 
five pillars of Islam (lima rukun Islam) such as confession of the faith, 
five daily prayers, fasting during Ramadhan, alms-giving, and 
pilgrimage to Mecca. They, on the other hand, could hardly go across 
the border of the abangan identity such as klenengan tradition, kejawen 
ritual system, and the like. Between the two religious identities lies a 
bold fault-line dividing each of them in order not to enter into one 
another. Once one crossed the border, he/she might be accused by 
his/her fellows as disloyal to his/her traditional identity. 
Unlike in the past, becoming abangan or santri in today’s context 
does not necessitate a stringent code of conduct that determines the 
clarity of religious identity. Becoming abangan or santri is a matter of 
whatever-you-like mentality or voluntary action among the Javanese. 
In some cases, becoming a Javanese Muslim is half abangan and half 
santri or vise-versa. A Javanese Muslim from abangan background now 
is found to be no longer contingent upon the stringent code of 
conduct prescribed by his community, whereas at the same time 
                                                                
32 Marc Benamou, RASA: Affect and Intuition in Javanese Musical Aesthetics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
  
The Changing Face of Javanese Islam 
61 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 12, Number 01, June 2018 
he/she can subscribe to the santri ritual system. Or the other way 
around, a Javanese Muslim derived from santri background can enter 
into the “grey area” formerly forbidden for him/her to enter, such as 
the tradition of klenengan, calendrical calculation (petungan), slametan 
ritual and so forth. 
Being a Javanese Muslim, therefore, has to do with a hybrid 
religious identity; the juncture where overlapping elements are mixed. 
This is not merely a matter of becoming abangan or santri in a totalistic 
and strict way; rather, it is becoming something in-between the two 
extreme poles, something almost impossible at the time of Geertz or 
beforehand. Suffice it to say that the variants of becoming Javanese 
Islam are multiple and diverse, not monolithic like in the past. This is 
so because the acculturation and transformation of Javanese Islam is 
continuously flowing and taking place with the passage of time.  
The continuous transformation of Javanese Islam cannot be 
dissociated from the ideological contest in the public sphere for 
maintaining and defending any particular religious identity. The public 
sphere serves as an open space for championing and influencing any 
religious ideology among the society. The public sphere offers 
constructive and productive mutual exchanges for the enrichment of 
each identity. For those who are involved, the public sphere is not 
perceived as battleground for negation of one another. It is within this 
context that such a productive acculturation leading to identity 
exchanges among abangans as well as santris is continuously taking 
place.  
The ideological contest in the public sphere has resulted in the 
shift in terms of religious identity among the Javanese Muslims.33 The 
phenomenon of internal conversion is likely to be one of the 
consequences of that contest, particularly among those abangans 
migrating to santri identity. In this case, a committed abangan may 
become another committed santri in its literal sense, so that they may 
disentangle all cultural aspects related to abangan identity they have had 
subscribed in the past. In the context of such an identity shift, the 
converts perceive what they have experienced as the process of hijrah 
(migration) from a particular religious identity to a totally different one. 
Once an abangan has committed to become a santri, it means that 
                                                                
33 See, for instance, Sutiyono, Benturan Budaya Islam: Puritan & Sinkretis (Jakarta: 
Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2010). 
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he/she is ready to give up his/her old identity and in order to 
subscribe to a completely new one by becoming a practicing Muslim.  
The phenomenon of such an internal conversion can easily be 
found in societies reputably known as the basis of abangan such as 
Solo, Sragen, Sukoharjo, Boyolali, Temanggung and the like.34 The 
reality of ideological migration is usually driven by a more intense 
process of dakwah and Islamization carried out by individuals or social 
organizations whose religious vision tends to be salafi. As has been 
known, those areas mentioned above are the place where militant 
organizations grow and develop significantly such as Majlis Tafsir Al-
Qur’an (MTA), Jama’ah Tabligh, Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and others. It seems that these 
organizations treat those regions as the basis of dakwah. This is why the 
massive growth and development of new emerging santris in those 
regions is incomparable to other regions in Java, due mainly to the 
aggressive activities of dakwah undertaken by those salafi-oriented 
individuals and social organizations. 
In terms of hybrid identity, a female informant in Solo named Mrs. 
Nunik, for instance, expressed her concerns about being “religious” by 
combining the identity of both abangan and santri at once. Her hybrid 
identity was revealed from the way she dressed in hijab, even though 
she was a nominal or non-practicing Muslim. As a convert from 
Christianity since she got married, she thought that the point of being 
religious is to be a good person. She argued that there is no point in 
embracing a particular religion if he/she cannot become a good human 
regardless of ritual practices he/she observes. She identified herself as 
a non-practicing Muslim, despite the hijab she wore like other Muslims 
in general. When she died, she did not want to be dressed like the dress 
code of typically Muslim deceased (pocong) during her funeral because 
she thought that this way is frightening. She wanted to be dressed in a 
priyayi (aristocrat) fashion like her father at his funeral since he was a 
dalang (shadow puppet performer). She wants to remain to look 
beautiful even though she is dead.35 
                                                                
34 Muhammad Wildan, “Mapping Radical Islam: A Study of the Proliferation of 
Radical Islam in Solo”, in Martin van Bruinessen, Contemporary Developments in Indonesian 
Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn” (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013), pp. 190-223. 
35 Interview with Mrs. Nunik, 17 April 2017. As a sociological background, Mrs. Nunik 
is a street vendor in Solobalapan railway station, Surakarta. She is selling drinks such 
coffee and tea, cakes and some other traditional food for passengers passing by. She 
occupies a narrow food stall of 2 m2 with three other vendors next to her; one of them 
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It seems that what drove Mrs Nunik and a great deal of other 
female Muslims to wear hijab is not her intrinsic motif per se; rather, it 
was driven by the force of geographical determinism in doing so. It is a 
matter of fact that most of areas in Java has been swept by the waves 
of Islamization undertaken by salafi individuals or organizations as 
mentioned above. What these individuals and organizations are doing 
so far is creating a new mode of normality in terms of religious life 
significantly different from the past. As found elsewhere in Java, there 
are more female Muslims covering their bodies with Muslim dress-
code (busana Muslimah) such as hijab which can be easily noticeable 
compared to their fellow male Muslims. This phenomenon 
nevertheless does not automatically indicate that they are all practicing 
Muslims; some of them may be yes. They subscribe to particular dress-
code because they feel that the condition forces them to do so. 
The opposite way of internal conversion, i.e. from santri to abangan, 
is hardly found, due to the fact that being santri in the end of life for 
the Javanese is commonly understood as a repentance for whatever 
happened in their past. In this context, what is possibly the case is not 
an internal conversion, but the phenomenon of adopting the abangan 
life style by santris. More precisely, the santris are only empathetic 
towards the way the abangan live, such as the dress-code according to 
the Javanese tradition, bird keeping, the music tradition of klenengan, 
the slametan rituals and the like. This means that the adoption of 
religious identity among the santris to the Javanese identity runs only at 
the surface, not at the substance level. This is so due to the fact that 
becoming a fully committed abangan means that one has to be a non-
practicing Muslim in its conventional sense, because they have their 
own ritual system which differs significantly from the santris’ ritual 
system.   
Java has long been the battleground for ideological contest among 
different as well as within the same religious traditions. The contests 
over ideological and religious values are still taking place even though 
on the surface level the bulk of Javanese continues to speak up about 
religious harmony. It reaches its momentum in the aftermath of New 
                                                                                                                                      
is Christian. The other three fellow vendors wear the same hijab as Mrs Nunik wears, 
but their religious identity is slightly different to each other. One of them, called Mrs 
Sunarmi, claims herself to be more devout Muslim than Mrs Nunik by doing five daily 
prayers, fasting during Ramadhan month and paying alms. She wishes that she can go 
pilgrimage to Mecca someday by saving money from what she is earning as a vendor. 
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Order regime where the public sphere welcomes all types of utterance 
and articulation of extreme different viewpoints on religious issues 
previously discouraged and banned by the regime. The harsh contest 
particularly can be felt through social media such as whatsapp 
application where members from different religious groups are 
involved in the exchanges of ideas over religious issues. It is difficult to 
determine who won the battle provided that each individual in 
particular membership of social media group can now examine and 
challenge the established tradition of religious orthodoxy. Suffice it to 
say that everybody can now enjoy freedom of expression which was 
too luxurious during the New Order regime. 
The ideological and religious battle amounts to unstable 
eclecticism in identity among the Javanese Muslims. Cultural 
borrowings among different religious identities are thus highly likely to 
happen, even though the reasons behind these borrowings during 
these days are not always easily identifiable. This phenomenon is 
commonly characterized as assimilation or acculturation process in 
sociological studies and social sciences.36 Adoption to new religious 
identity is the most possible way of negotiation in order to avoid social 
conflict. This seems to be the case with the majority of converts 
among the Javanese Muslims. At other occasions, however, the 
process of negotiation can result in tension and resistance. In this 
context, the creation of hybrid identity among the Javanese Muslims is 
possible as a result of negotiation and reception.  
 
Conclusion 
As demonstrated above, defending the old narrative about 
Javanese Islam, is not only irrelevant for today’s context in the post 
Geertz era, but also theoretically misleading. This is so due to the 
                                                                
36 Many observers sometime lump the term assimilation together with acculturation, 
which are different to each other in social sciences. Following Alba and Nee, Herbert 
J. Ganz defines assimilation as “the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary 
cultural and social differences”. Acculturation, however, refers to the same thing as 
assimilation at the cultural, not social, level. Moreover, both terms have something to 
do with social mobility of people (usually immigrants). Whereas acculturation takes 
place at the immigrants’ initiative to integrate to local culture, assimilation is taking 
place when immigrants are being accepted by the non-immigrants whom they seek to 
join and it usually runs slowly but naturally. For the differences of the two terms, see, 
among others, Herbert J. Ganz, “Acculturation, Assimilation and Mobility”, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, Vol. 30/No. 1 (January 2007): pp. 152-164.  
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inability of Geertz’s conception on the Javanese Islam to 
accommodate the most current narratives on the tremendous shift, 
transformation and evolution of meaning as experienced by the 
Javanese Islam. In the Geertz era, referring to the entity of Javanese 
Islam comprises only the two variants of his trilogy, abangan and priyayi; 
in today’s context it can also comprise the whole variants of Muslims, 
including the santris. This reality is attributed to the mixing of religious 
identities among all variants of the Javanese Muslims which overlap 
one another, so that the borrowing and adopting of religious identity 
among all elements of the Javanese is likely to happen. 
Furthermore, the grand-narratives of Javanese Islam as espoused 
by both Geertz and Woodward contain serious laxities, both at 
conceptual and at empirical levels. Their conception of Javanese Islam 
follows a zero-sum pattern; on the one hand Geertz and his followers 
identify Javanese Islam as a syncretic religious entity which is distorted 
from normative Islam. On the other hand, Woodward argues against 
Geertz by arguing that the entity of Javanese Islam represents an 
equally identical, standardized piety as prescribed by the normative 
Islam elsewhere, especially in its place of origin.  
As this article has demonstrated, both poles mentioned above are 
theoretically and empirically unfounded due in part to their inability to 
accommodate the comprehensive portrayal of Javanese Islam whose 
characteristics are fluid, dynamic and multivocal. The continuous 
acculturation and islamization among the abangans that leads to the 
transformation of religious identity of Javanese Islam is the main 
explanation behind the changing dynamics of Javanese. Last but not 
the least, the acculturation and Islamization is responsible for making 
the hybrid identity of Javanese Islam as well as the phenomenon of 
internal conversion among the Javanese Muslims. [] 
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